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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. OWENS, 
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vs. 
CINDY LOU YOUNG (OWENS), 
Respondent. 
AMENDED ORDER ON 
RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION TO 
COMMISSIONER'S RULING 
Civil No. 884900472 
Judge William B. Bohling 
This matter came before the Court on August 26,2002, for a hearing on Respondent's Objection 
to Commissioner's Ruling. Respondent was present and represented by her attorney, Delano S. Findlay. 
Diana Obray appeared on behalf of the Estate of Robert J. Owens. After reading the written memoranda 
submitted by both parties and after hearing oral argument from both parties, THE COURT DIRECTS 
AND ORDERS THE FOLLOWING: 
1. The above-entitled cause of action shall be dismissed for Respondent's failure to comply 
with Utah R. Civ. Pro. 25(a)(1). 
2. The above-entitled cause of action shall be dismissed because the claim did not survive 
the death of the Petitioner*. Robert J. Owens. 
DATED this Q day of , 2002 
By the Court 
Judge William H. Bohling 
Approval as to form: 
Delano S. Findlay 
Attorney for Respondent 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MONDAY, AUGUST 26, 2 0 02, 9:15 A.M. 
-oooOooo-
THE COURT: We're on the record in the matter of 
Robert J. Owens, or the Estate of Robert J. Owens versus 
Cindy Lou Owens, Case No. 884900472. 
Counsel, would you enter your appearances, please. 
MR. FINDLAY: Delano Findlay for the movant or 
respondent. 
MS. OBRAY: Diana Obray for the estate of Robert 
Owens. 
THE COURT: Thank you. I think these are your 
objections, aren't they, Mr. Findlay? 
MR. FINDLAY: It is, Your Honor. 
The Honorable Commissioner denied a motion to 
substitute the estate for two reasons. One, it hadn't been 
substituted within 90 days and, two, as required by the rule 
or specified by the rule -- and there's some -- some 
exceptions to that. And, number two, she held that the 
case, or ruled that the case was moot and was terminated by 
the death of the decedent, Mr. Owens. 
She held that based on two cases, Prees v. Prees 
and Dailey v. Dailey. Both of those cases involved 
situations where the decree was final after the death of the 
party, and the court held that you can't, of course, divorce 
someone who's dead. 
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In one case, I think the Prees case, the -- well, 
in both cases, the Court had ruled in one case that the --
the decree had been entered but not final for six months, 
for some reason. 
In the other case, the decree hadn't been entered. 
The court had announced that it intended to and, before the 
decree was entered, the party died unbeknownst to the court 
and unbeknownst to the other party. The attorney for the 
other party went ahead and -- the plaintiff went ahead and 
sought a -- got the decree -- went in for the default 
judgment and the default judgment was entered. And that's 
the Prees case. And in that case, the husband was killed in 
a boating accident, fishing in Alaska, and the word didn't 
arrive until after that. 
But in both cases, the Court set those aside 
saying, "You can't get a divorce from someone after they've 
passed away and the action is mooted." 
This is not that kind of a case, Your Honor. This 
is a case where a decree has been entered and had been in 
effect for nearly 12 years -- or 12 years. I guess about 12 
years. It was entered in '89. He passed away in '91. 
There had been a petition that he had filed to 
modify the decree. Ms. Young, now Mrs. Thompson, had filed 
a counter-petition to modify the decree and increase child 
support. She'd had to hire a private detective to find 
where he was working, because he told her he was unemployed. 
They found him working at Kennecott. There's been complaint 
that that has not been resolved sooner. 
As Your Honor knows, this has been a hotly 
contested case. We're here again on the case that Your 
Honor's sat on a number of times. And while it may tend to 
become a little bit annoying to the Court and annoying to 
the parties, still, there are issues there that are 
important. And the issues of back child support are what 
should have been the child support because it was not 
reported and it was not changed while he was alive. 
Certainly, there's no reason why those don't 
survive his death, again, and at least have to be settled by 
his estate. He left an estate of some kind behind, whatever 
that is. 
As Your Honor knows, there were motions on motions 
and objections on objections all the way. And you cannot 
get a certification of trial in a domestic case if there are 
motions outstanding that are unresolved. 
During the two- to three-year period that this 
case was not resolved, that the petition was not resolved, 
that was the case. If we look at the docket, we'll -- the 
Court will see there may have been some brief periods of 
time there, very brief, between motions or -- but when those 
motions were filed, they had to be -- they had to be faced. 
5 
They had to be reconciled and disposed of. And there were 
objections, always objections, just as there was at the 
trial that Your Honor had back in 1997. I think it took 
until a year later, June of '98, to resolve the objections 
because of the objections that were filed to the Court's 
orders and to the filings. 
That's been the case here. This isn't a case 
that's appropriate for dismissal for failure to prosecute. 
And, in fact, it's been prosecuted maybe a little too much. 
But I don't know how you solve that, where you have the 
problems that we've had in this case. 
I'd just refer Your Honor to Comm. Arnett's review 
before he recused himself of the entire file, from the 
beginning to the end, and his comments that he made in the 
minute entry of -- well, it was filed on February the 24th, 
2 000, in which he -- he made some comments with regard to 
the litigiousness and the obstreperous nature and the 
incredible nature of the petitioner at that time. 
The cases that I've talked with Your Honor about 
are clearly widely distinctual. And there are some cases 
that are opposite that allow the Court --or that show that 
the Court has considered issues in family relations cases 
after the death of one of the decedents. This one is child 
support; nevertheless, it is child support that was based 
upon his earnings. There's a record of his earnings, 
there's a record of Ms. Young's earnings. Those can be 
brought forward. The child support can easily be 
determined. Whether or not there's enough in the estate to 
recover is another question, but it ought to be resolved on 
that basis, Your Honor. 
The other issue is the issue of whether the 
failure to substitute the party within 90 days is fatal. 
The cases that are cited by the petitioner do not deal with 
the issue of where such a thing happened, but I would like 
to refer the Court to the Federal Rules, because the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure are nearly a carbon copy of the 
Federal Rules. And as Your Honor knows, we look to the 
Federal Rules in Utah to construe our own rules because it 
doesn't mean they're controlling in all cases, but it does 
mean that they have a very -- that they are weighty. 
And I've cited a case in my objection that is a 
Federal Rules case. If I may have a moment, Your Honor. I 
might be able to find the case faster. 
Out of the Second Circuit. Did I say Second? I 
mean to say Seventh. Out of the Seventh Circuit. The case 
is Continental Bank, N.A. , v. Andrew C. Meyer, Jr., at al. , 
and it's at 10 3d 1293. And in that case, the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit -- and I don't have a page 
number of that --of the citation in the case because I got 
this out of Versus Law and it doesn't give us the page 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
19 
21 
22 
23 
24 
numbers . 
But the court said, "While couched in mandatory 
terms, the advisory committee notes to Rule 2 5 indicate that 
the 9 0-day requirement may be extended by Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 6(b) and 6(b)(2). Rule 6(b)(2) states that: 
"The District Court, for the cause -- for cause shown may, 
at any time in its discretion upon the motion made after the 
expiration of the specified time period, permit the act to 
be done or the failure to act as a result of excusable 
neglect." 
And then it talks about the history of Rule 25(a) 
and Rule 6(b) "makes it clear that the 90-day time period 
was not intended to act as a bar to otherwise meritorious 
actions and the extensions of the period of time may be 
liberally granted." 
And they then quote another case. In that case, 
they quote Tatterson -- that's two T's -- Tatterson v. 
18 Coppers -- and that's two P's -- Company, 104 5th Rules of 
Decisions Frd. 19. And that's Western District of 
20 Pennsylvania, 1984. 
Your Honor, we believe this case is very 
meritorious. The failure to pay the amount of child support 
that should have been paid and to report the proper amount 
of child support and employment was egregious. It took 
25 great efforts by Ms. Young then, now Mrs. Thompson, to find 
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out where Mr. Owens was working. And we had to subpoena his 
records from Kennecott Copper to find out what his income 
was. They weren't voluntarily given. There was a lot of 
acrimony at the time, for whatever the reason or whatever 
the purpose. That wasn't able to be brought forth, and 
Mrs. Owens -- Mrs. Thompson has been effectively cheated out 
of several thousand dollars of child support that she had to 
forego, the children had to forego while they were living. 
This is not ongoing child support we're talking about, it's 
child support in the past. 
The substitution didn't occur sooner because 
Mr. Owens made a will 15 days before he passed away and 
named, as the executor or executrix of the will, the 
personal representative, his -- his female companion, Kathy 
Lee Seech. She did not file and did not intend to file. 
She concluded that it was a small estate; she would not file 
to settle it. 
18 I Ms. Young had to eventually -- Mrs. Thompson had 
19 to eventually file on behalf of her minor child, as the 
20 I guardian for her minor child, and apply to become the -- the 
21 | legal --or the personal representative in order to get 
22 I bring the issue to a head. And as soon -- within ten days 
after deployment of a personal representative, which is 
Ms. Seech, in March, we filed a motion to substitute. 
25 Now, some of the cases may say that you can always 
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file a motion even though it hasn't run, or seek an 
extension of time. That may well be the case. I don't know 
the difference between filing a motion and having it sit 
there and wait till it can properly be resolved and heard 
from filing the motion. And I would submit, Your Honor, 
that that's excusable neglect and it's for good cause. But 
the case could have been brought within the 90 days had 
there been cooperation with the estate. 
Now that the estate -- it hasn't been brought, the 
estate is asserting that as a defense -- I think they ought 
to be estopped. I think that the Court ought to grant it 
based on that. It's not a momentous matter to determine and 
it won't take a lot of time, a small evidentiary hearing, 
14 I hearing what the child support should have been. 
I'll submit that, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Counsel? 
17 I MS. OBRAY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
18 I Comm. Bradford sought to dismiss this case and we 
would ask this Court to do the same, as well as award the 
estate attorneys fees and costs. There are three bases for 
dismissing this case, and the first is a failure to 
prosecute under Rule 41. The second is a failure to 
substitute the estate as a party according to Rule 25. And 
the third is a failure to state a claim upon which relief 
25 I can be granted, under Rule 12(b)(6). 
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The underlying issue in this case is a petition to 
modify a divorce decree that was filed in 1998. And there 
was nothing done on that case until, you know, just 
recently, after the death of Mr. Owens on August 2 9th of 
2001. 
And Rule 41 requires that a person bringing a case 
prosecute that case diligently, and that was not done here. 
Here it is, four years later, and they're still trying to 
resolve this issue. Mr. Owens has now died, he has no 
opportunity to defend himself or present evidence on his 
behalf. He's been dead almost a year. And just because of 
the length of time between the filing of -- between the 
filing of this case and the pursuance by the respondent, the 
respondent's failed to prosecute under Rule 41, and this 
15 case should be dismissed. 
The second basis is a failure to substitute the 
estate as a party under Rule 25. Rule 25 requires, at the 
18 | death of a party or the -- it required the respondent in 
19 | this case to substitute the estate as a party, which was not 
20 I done. 
21 In our memorandum in support, we mention that we 
actually received copies of a -- a motion to -- for an 
extension of time, a motion to substitute, but those were 
24 apparently never filed by Mr. Findlay. 
25 Robert Owens' previous attorney, Ephraim 
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Fankhauser, filed a notice of death one week after Mr. Owens 
died and served that Notice of Death on the court and on all 
relevant parties. Mr. Findlay had 90 days to either 
substitute the estate as a party or to move for an 
extension, and he did not do so. And there was no 
cooperation required by the estate; all he had to do is move 
to substitute a party, which he did not do. And the rule 
requires that the case be dismissed if that was not done. 
And we need to look no further than the Civil Rules of 
Procedure, Utah Civil Rules of Procedure. 
And the third basis for dismissal is that this 
case states no claim on which relief may be granted. 
Mr. Owens has been dead now for almost a year and, at his 
death, the action terminated. There are some actions that 
survive the death of a party, but this is not -- there's no 
case law or rules or statutes to support the notion that 
this type of action survives the death of a party. 
And in his objection, Mr. Findlay cites a couple 
of cases as support for what -- for this motion, for the 
objection that he files today. And those cases are not on 
point. The first -- are not on point. 
The first case is the In re: Harper Estate, which 
has been overruled by Dailey v. Dailey, and Dailey v. Dailey 
was used by Comm. Bradford in dismissing this case in the 
first go round. 
12 
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And another case he refers to is Columbo v. 
Columbo. And in that case, the court actually eliminated 
the child support obligation of the deceased father. And 
they -- and finding persuasive in that case, they found that 
the deceased father had left his child a life insurance 
policy, that the child's mother was receiving social 
security survivorship benefits, and also that the father had 
died. And the court considered those all material changes 
of circumstances which warranted the dismissal of any 
further child support obligation on the part of the father. 
And we have exactly similar facts here. Mr. Owens 
is dead and he's been dead now for almost a year. He left 
his son a $30,000 life insurance policy. Cindy Thompson is 
now receiving more than $1,000 a month in social security 
benefits, as opposed to the $200-some-odd a month that 
Robert Owens was paying in life. And so the cases 
Mr. Findlay cites in his objection are not on point. 
And since there is no support for continuation of 
this action, we would ask the Court to dismiss this case, 
because the action terminated upon Mr. Owens' death. And 
the estate has had to incur considerable time and expense in 
defending these motions, and we would ask the Court for an 
award of attorneys fees and costs. Thank you. 
MR. FINDLAY: If I may, briefly, Your Honor. 
There are about six pages in the docket since the filing of 
13 
this petition or counter-petition to modify based on 
increased child support. This case has not failed to be 
prosecuted. It has been very prosecuted. This is not at 
all a case where the case has just sat there. We have --
THE COURT: Did the six pages all deal with the 
modification or were there other issues that were --
MR. FINDLAY: No. There were other issues that 
kept us from getting the modification. There were motion 
after motion filed by Mr. Owens for custody, for medical 
expenses and for other objections. Ms. Young filed one 
motion, as I recall, a counter-motion on one of his motions 
for medical expenses. She made one objection. Every order 
that the court made in this case was objected to by 
Mr. Fankhauser ad infinitum, and even a motion to recuse the 
commissioner, Comm. Arnett, because of his expression of 
what he felt was lack of credibility by Mr. Owens. These 
things all took place during this period of time. 
Your Honor's also well aware that we had to -- to 
garnish Mr. Owens' wages to get the child support, the 
judgment that Your Honor issued. All of those things 
happened. And as I have mentioned, we cannot certify the 
case ready for trial until the motions outstanding are 
resolved. 
The form -- there is a form that is required for 
certification for domestic case that has two pages of listed 
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items. And it's -- I've never been able to get a case 
certified ready for trial if a motion wasn't concluded. 
And Your Honor can note by looking at the docket 
that it wasn't a great period of time between the time of 
the last motion once there are the objections to the order 
on the last motion where it concluded and the -- and the 
death of the petitioner. That alone, I think, is nothing 
like the case they cite, which is -- well, it's Countryside 
Manor, I believe. I won't go find it. It's in their 
record. 
As to the two cases that they talk about -- and 
let me say this first. Mr. Owens' attorney, Mr. Fankhauser, 
and though he didn't do it under those terms, did --or did 
file something. He filed what was called a Termination of 
Jurisdiction, or a Notice of Termination of Jurisdiction. I 
responded to it. I filed a response and said no, the 
court's jurisdiction isn't terminated; the Court has 
jurisdiction of the estate of the decedent. 
And as I explained in my argument we took all of 
that time trying to get a personal representative appointed 
before one could be substituted or before the Court could 
decide whether to substitute. The Court would not, of 
course, have substituted the estate without the appointment 
of a personal representative. I think that's very good 
cause, and I think it's excusable neglect. 
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In re: Harper's Estate, it's interesting. They 
say it was overruled. And there's some talk in the opinion 
by Judge --or Justice Crocket that they overruled it. But 
he was talking, in that sense, in dissent. In fact Harper's 
Estate was not overruled by Prees or Bailey. Harper's 
Estate -- well, the issue in Harper's Estate that we're 
talking about wasn't overruled. And the Columbo v. Columbo 
she mentions doesn't apply because they -- they did not 
grant the child support. That has nothing to do with 
whether they considered the issue or not. They fully 
considered the issue after the death of a party, and they 
decided not to grant child support on other bases. And the 
basis was that he had an insurance policy. And that was 
ongoing child support. It doesn't apply here. 
Ms. Young is getting ongoing child support. 
Fortunately, for the first time in her life, she's getting 
child support based on the social security that's paid, 
after Mr. Owens' death, without having to go to court to 
force it. The first time since the decree -- has she ever 
gotten child support without having to go to Court to force 
it. 
In this particular case, she's seeking child 
support she shouldn't have gotten -- or she should have 
gotten, child support she was cheated out of, child support 
that is passed, against the estate. And I believe that 
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that's -- CoIujnJbo doesn't -- doesn't --is not applicable, 
it doesn't hold against that at all. In fact, it holds that 
you can consider a domestic dispute after the death of one 
of the parties where there has been a child support --or 
has been a decree. That is what they did. 
The same thing happened in Harper's Estate, 
whether they claim it's overruled or not. They did consider 
it and they found a way around it. They talked about the 
problem of the death, but they found a way around it and 
still awarded the -- well, they found a way around it 
because they said the ethic tool -- they used the equity 
powers of the court not to award the -- the surviving spouse 
the estate because of other reasons. 
The policy that is for Ms. Owens' — or 
Mrs. Thompson's son Jacob has nothing to do with paying her 
back child support. It might be reachable, but she can't 
reach it without legal process. There's some legal process 
going on that basis, but that's because Mr. Owens also 
failed to have a policy of insurance which the decree 
ordered him to have. 
Your Honor, there is every reason for the Court to 
exercise its discretion and equity and -- and grant the 
motion to -- to appoint personal representative. And 
there -- I don't believe there's any reason at all -- I 
don't believe the cases cited at all require dismissal of 
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this action. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Findlay. 
Having heard the arguments of counsel and having 
had the opportunity to review the memoranda of the parties, 
it's the Court's decision to sustain the recommendation of 
Comm. Bradford and dismiss this matter. I think it's 
arguable whether or not there was a failure to prosecute 
this claim. Certainly, it has been pending for a long time 
and there's been little action done on the modification, 
although there have been a number of other matters that have 
taken this Court's time. 
The Court doesn't have a recollection that it was 
all one-sided. It seemed to be it was -- it's as 
contentious a divorce case as the Court has -- has ever had 
the opportunity to deal with, and I think it came from both 
sides. 
It's clear to this Court that Rule 25 does 
18 require, and appropriately would require, that this matter 
be dismissed, and also the Court is unpersuaded by the 
20 respondent's cases, believes a far better law interpretation 
of the cases is -- is defined, that the matter does not 
22 survive the death of the --of the petitioner in this case. 
For all those reasons, the Court is entering its 
decision, is going to request that the petitioner prepare an 
order consistent with my ruling. And I decline to enter an 
2 
«, award of attorneys fees. It seems to me that the basis for 
which -- and the failure to do so is not met in this case. 
3 I And for those reasons, the Court decides as it does. 
4 Thank you. 
5 MS. OBRAY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: We'll be in recess. 
7 (Whereupon, at 9:40 a.m., the hearing 
8 was concluded.) 
9 -oooOooo-
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